Sense of frustration: the debate on land reform in South Africa by Müller, Melanie & Kotzur, Laura
www.ssoar.info
Sense of frustration: the debate on land reform in
South Africa
Müller, Melanie; Kotzur, Laura
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Stellungnahme / comment
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Müller, M., & Kotzur, L. (2019). Sense of frustration: the debate on land reform in South Africa. (SWP Comment,
22/2019). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit.
https://doi.org/10.18449/2019C22v02
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-62730-3
  
 
NO. 22 APRIL 2019 Introduction 
Sense of Frustration 
The Debate on Land Reform in South Africa 
Melanie Müller and Laura Kotzur 
In December 2018, the ruling African National Congress (ANC) and the opposition 
party, Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), agreed to draft an amendment to the con-
stitution in the South African Parliament. Its intention is to give concrete form to 
existing options to expropriate land without compensation. The narrative of land 
reform discussions in South Africa often creates the impression that the expropria-
tion of land owned by white farmers without compensation could solve the country’s 
problem of unequal income distribution. It would, however, take a whole set of politi-
cal reforms to create more social justice. Visible successes might help appease those 
groups that are disappointed with South African democracy 25 years after the end of 
apartheid, but if the reforms fail then this will likely exacerbate the already palpable 
sense of frustration felt by ordinary South Africans. 
 
The equitable distribution of land is a 
topic that has dominated political debate 
in South Africa, particularly in the run-up 
to the 2019 elections to be held in May. To-
wards the end of apartheid, Whites owned 
more than 87 percent of the land, but they 
only made up 11 percent of the population. 
Since forming a government in 1994, the 
ANC has ruled out broad-based land reform, 
but has announced that, within five years, 
30 percent of the country will be redistri-
buted according to the principle of ‘Willing 
Buyer, Willing Seller’ – the government 
will buy land from white farmers if they 
consent to sell. Black South Africans can 
then buy the land, partly funded through 
subsidy programmes. However, 25 years 
after the first democratic elections, the 
results are not looking good. By 2018, only 
9.7 percent of land was redistributed, far 
short of the promised 30 percent. The 
South African government had repeatedly 
postponed its own deadline for achieving 
this goal until, eventually, it had to give 
it up. 
In the past year, land distribution, which 
is seen as unjust by large parts of the popu-
lation, has become a key issue in the politi-
cal debate on social justice in South Africa. 
During the election campaign, land reform 
has been top of the political agendas of the 
three most important parties – the ANC, 
the EFF and the Democratic Alliance (DA). 
The DA offers more market-based problem-
solving tools, the EFF has focussed on bring-
ing land under state ownership and the 
ANC’s approach contains elements of both 
approaches. 
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There is a lot at stake for the governing 
ANC. After the end of apartheid, it came 
to power on the promise of overcoming 
the social inequality between Blacks and 
Whites. Yet despite some progress, such as 
an improved energy supply, South Africa 
now has some of the highest levels of social 
inequality in the world. According to Sta-
tistics South Africa (Stats SA), 55 percent of 
58 million South Africans currently live in 
poverty. According to official figures, the 
unemployment rate is around 27 percent. 
Poverty continues to affect first and fore-
most those identified under apartheid as 
Blacks or Coloureds. In the meantime, a 
small black middle class has emerged. 
For a long time, the ANC, formerly a 
liberation movement, was practically the 
only political alternative for the non-white 
electorate because the party wanted to 
combat the unequal distribution of income 
between Blacks and Whites resulting from 
apartheid. Although the DA has now estab-
lished itself as the second strongest power, 
it is only gradually gaining popularity 
among the black population; to date, its 
votes have come primarily from Whites 
and Coloureds. 
In the 2014 parliamentary elections, the 
ANC lost its two-thirds majority which fell 
to 62 percent. The EFF has entered parlia-
ment for the first time, gaining six percent 
of the vote. Its manifesto was targeted at 
those sections of the population that were 
economically excluded and had lost con-
fidence in the ANC. The EFF’s key election 
promise was and is to nationalise the 
mining industry and land. This policy piled 
considerable parliamentary pressure on 
the ANC during the last legislative period. 
MPs in the EFF party have tabled several 
motions to investigate the possibility of 
expropriations without compensation. But 
the ANC has repeatedly refused to deal with 
the issue. However, in early 2018, ANC MPs 
voted in favour of a new EFF resolution to 
consider amending the South African con-
stitution to allow the options to be examined. 
The Various Aspects of 
Land Reform 
The ANC has since managed to seize the 
initiative on the issue of land reform. Since 
February 2018 when Cyril Ramaphosa took 
over from ex-President Jacob Zuma, who 
was suspected of corruption, the party has 
struggled to regain lost confidence. Zuma is 
accused of ‘state capture’: appointing politi-
cal allies to government posts for his own 
financial gain. A commission is currently 
investigating the allegations. Many South 
Africans now believe that the former lib-
eration movement has betrayed its ideals 
and now prioritises enriching itself eco-
nomically. 
Their frustration is reflected in the 
increasing numbers of those not voting. 
Voter turnout has been steadily declining 
since 1994. In 2014, 43 percent of voters 
either did not register at all or were reg-
istered but did not vote. As a result, the 
ANC gained only 35 percent of all eligible 
votes in South Africa, down from 54 per-
cent in 1994. 
The programme of land reform was 
greeted by concerns both at home and 
abroad that it might be accompanied by 
violent expropriations. However, to date, 
steps taken by Pretoria indicate a democratic 
and orderly process. In December 2018, 
a committee presented the results of a 
ten-month consultation process that asked 
groups across the country for their opin-
ions on land reform. That same month, 
the South African Parliament confirmed 
it would implement the committee’s key 
recommendations. 
These recommendations include an 
amendment to paragraph 25 of the South 
African Constitution which explicitly de-
fines under what conditions land can be 
expropriated without compensation. In 
fact, this possibility is already provided for 
in the South African constitution – as it 
is in many other constitutions. It has, how-
ever, hardly been used at all in practice. 
Concerns that concreticising paragraph 25 
could lead to large-scale expropriations 
without compensation appear to be un-
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founded. According to political scientist 
Ruth Hall, one of ten experts on Cyril 
Ramaphosa’s advisory panel on land re-
form, paragraph 36 of the constitution 
would also have to be amended for this to 
happen. While it does allow rights restric-
tions under certain conditions – such as 
the right to own property – it requires that 
such restrictions are “reasonable and justi-
fiable”. Amending paragraph 36 would 
require a 75 percent majority in Parlia-
ment – which is unlikely even after the 
2019 general election. 
In December 2018, Parliament decided to 
set up an ad hoc working group comprised 
of representatives of the various parties and 
additional persons. It is expected to report 
back to Parliament with a draft proposal to 
supplement paragraph 25. The supplement 
is to contain an explicit formulation for 
cases where expropriation is possible, thus 
legitimising it. Experts expect it to specify 
the criteria under which compensation can 
be paid out. In their opinion, expropria-
tions without compensation will only occur 
in very few cases, for example if land is 
used as a speculative commodity. However, 
they complain that the problems of high-
grade social inequality cannot be solved 
by merely redistributing land. 
Ultimately, it is not simply a question 
of making land available but also about its 
use – South Africa needs to find solutions 
to a complex problem which extends 
beyond the issue of expropriation without 
compensation. Currently, at least three 
aspects of the problem form the core of the 
political debate. Firstly, what mix of policy 
instruments is needed to achieve a fairer 
distribution of land and resources without 
harming agriculture? Secondly, it is a mat-
ter of ensuring legal security for the people 
who live on communal land – land that is 
administered by traditional elites and located 
predominantly in rural provinces. And 
thirdly, the more equitable distribution of 
housing in cities plays an important role. 
Historical Inequality and 
Land Ownership 
The unequal distribution of land in South 
Africa was cemented by a series of policies 
and laws enacted before and during apart-
heid. The Natives Land Act of 1913, which 
provided for a redistribution of ownership 
in South Africa, designated areas exclusively 
for Whites. As a result, Blacks were expelled 
from their land. This structural inequality 
was promoted under apartheid from 1948. 
The apartheid regime not only divided the 
population into different racial groups, it 
also physically separated these groups. 
Between 1960 and 1980, around 3.5 mil-
lion black people were forcibly (and often 
violently) resettled in the ‘homelands’. 
These rural areas were under the admin-
istration of the traditional elites, that is, 
representatives of tribal ruling structures 
and dynasties, such as chiefs, who had in 
place the administrative structures of tra-
ditional authorities. Under apartheid, mem-
bers of those traditional authorities enjoyed 
a special status due to their administrative 
powers and were thus able to distinguish 
themselves from the rest of the black popu-
lation. 
Other black South Africans, officially 
known as ‘Africans’, were prohibited from 
engaging in their own economic activities 
and from acquiring land. As part of the 
Bantu Education system, black people were 
educated to carry out orders; they were 
not trained to learn how to become self-em-
ployed. Members of the black population 
were mostly employed in agriculture and 
mining as workers for white owners or 
as domestic staff in white households. 
The regime continued to pursue its 
policy of segregation in the cities. The 
Group Areas Act came into force in 1950 
and provided for cities to be subdivided 
according to racist criteria. Large parts of 
the urban population were forcibly and 
violently moved to urban areas designated 
for their use only. The different city dis-
tricts were allocated resources, such as 
road construction or access to electricity or 
water, based on a racist hierarchy. Areas 
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where Whites lived were afforded special 
privileges, while Blacks were forced to live 
in miserable conditions. There were also 
gradations between Indians, Coloureds and 
Africans; these groups were also physically 
separated from each other. 
The uneven distribution of infrastructural 
resources is still visible today; one conse-
quence of segregation is the dysfunctionality 
of some areas. 
It is precisely these structural differences 
for Blacks and Whites promoted by the 
apartheid regime that the ANC promised to 
overcome after the end of apartheid. After 
the first democratic elections in 1994, it 
began implementing land redistribution 
programmes. However, the ANC eventually 
decided to forego a comprehensive and pro-
found programme of land reform and the 
resulting expropriation of land owned by 
Whites. 
The ANC has three programmes aimed 
at improving the situation for black South 
Africans: 
∎ The purpose of the redistribution pro-
gramme was to redistribute land former-
ly owned by Whites in order to eliminate 
the country’s structural inequality. The 
programme is based on the principle of 
‘Willing Buyer, Willing Seller’, as de-
scribed above. 
∎ The restitution programme provided 
either for the restitution of land or finan-
cial compensation for those who were 
forcibly expelled from their land as a 
result of racist legislation. Beneficiaries 
are not necessarily entitled to the territory 
they lost, but to substitute areas or alter-
natively to financial compensation. This 
should ensure that productive farms and 
other businesses are not affected by the 
land being returned to its rightful own-
ers. 
∎ The tenure programme aims to provide 
legal certainty for those who continue to 
live or work on communal land (in the 
former homelands) or as tenants on land 
(usually) owned by Whites. Various laws 
should ensure that these individuals can-
not simply be evicted from land, even if 
they were not its legitimate owners. 
Given the ANC governments’ poor record 
on redistribution, the effectiveness of these 
programmes is now being called into ques-
tion. By calling for blanket expropriations 
without compensation, the EFF have made 
it clear that, in their opinion, land redistri-
bution can only be achieved through ex-
propriation. However, an evaluation of 
South African land policy since the end of 
apartheid indicates that it is not absolutely 
necessary. The report argued for greater use 
of this option if, for example, the land is 
not being used productively. 
This was the result of a commission set 
up by parliament in 2016 and led by former 
President Kgalema Motlanthe. By October 
2017, it had dealt comprehensively with 
issues of distributive justice in South Africa. 
According to the commission, the reasons 
for the sluggish redistribution of land are 
not necessarily down to flaws in the way 
existing programmes have been set up, but 
instead due to their poor implementation. 
In particular, the government is taking far 
too long to process redistribution applica-
tions. One key challenge is the rampant cor-
ruption and the resulting inefficiency of 
government agencies in South Africa. This 
appears to be the source of delays to pro-
cessing applications. 
It also undermines the legal security of 
black South Africans living in the former 
homelands and in the province of KwaZulu-
Natal. This is compounded by clientelist 
legislation and illegal practices by the tra-
ditional authorities which still hold sway 
in some regions. 
If greater equity is to be achieved in the 
distribution of land, there is a need for a 
change of direction in various areas. In Sep-
tember 2018, Cyril Ramaphosa appointed 
ten experienced experts to the aforemen-
tioned panel (see p.3) to advise him on fur-
ther steps. However, the South African gov-
ernment is primarily confronted with the 
political question of whether it dares to dis-
empower the influential traditional author-
ities. 
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Communal Land and Clientelism 
Originally, the ANC had wanted to abolish 
the administrative structure described 
above, in which traditional authorities were 
responsible for administering former home-
land areas, after the end of apartheid. But it 
never happened. Then, in the 1990s, violent 
conflicts broke out between the ANC and 
the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), which was 
committed to representing the Zulu ethnic 
group. The ANC compromised in order to 
bring these conflicts to an end. This has 
resulted in the traditional authorities now 
enjoying special status. 
In South Africa, 17 million people out of 
a total population of 58 million live in the 
former homelands. According to South Afri-
can law, traditional authorities are sup-
posed to manage the land for the benefit 
of the communities living there. Decisions 
about land use are supposed to be taken 
jointly after intensive consultation. 
One concession made specifically to the 
group of Zulus in KwaZulu-Natal was the 
establishment of the Ingonyama Trust (IT), 
which administers around three million 
hectares of land in KwaZulu-Natal. Zulu 
King, Goodwill Zwelithini, is the sole trus-
tee of the fund, with a total of nine other 
members of traditional communities sitting 
on the board. 
Various studies have shown how illegal 
practices committed by those administering 
the fund violated the rights of people living 
on the communal land. They own Permis-
sion to Occupy Certificates (PTOs) that guar-
antee them the right to live on communal 
land. However, people living on communal 
land still require a proof of residence from 
the traditional authorities. This proof of 
residence allows them to sign contracts and, 
for example, open a bank account. 
The trust exploited the dependency en-
gendered by this situation. In October 2017, 
it placed an advertisement that promised 
to give people a proof of residence for an 
address if they converted their PTOs into a 
lease. However, the organisation failed to 
mention that additional costs were incurred. 
A few weeks later, in addition to the lease 
contracts, many people were also sent an 
invoice for the payment of rent. Moreover, 
IT concluded contracts with third parties, 
such as mining, agricultural or other com-
mercial enterprises, which wanted to use 
the areas it administered. By entering into 
lease contracts, IT sought to avoid consulta-
tion with the communities. 
The Motlanthe report finds that the 
undermining of the rights of people living 
on communal land, for which the tradi-
tional authorities are responsible, has 
become the rule rather than the exception. 
According to the report, the practice is par-
ticularly widespread in KwaZulu-Natal, but 
also occurs in other regions of South Africa. 
However, Aninka Claassens, a researcher 
at the University of Cape Town and mem-
ber of the Motlanthe Commission respon-
sible for land distribution, does not blame 
only the practices of the traditional author-
ities for the violation of rights of the rural 
population. According to her, in the 2000s, 
the South African Government adopted vari-
ous bills which increased the scope of the 
traditional authorities to conduct commer-
cial transactions. As a consequence, it be-
came easier for them to bypass consultation 
processes. The government also benefitted 
from this practice when it concluded con-
tracts, for instance with mining companies, 
without consulting the population. Although 
this was increasingly practiced under Jacob 
Zuma, it had also occurred during the term 
of his predecessor, Thabo Mbeki. 
Another aspect comes into play here: 
South Africa has pursued a policy of Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE) since 2001. 
The policy states that a certain percentage 
of black people must be represented in 
the administrative structures of firms and 
enterprises. Every economic cooperation 
thus brings advantages for an aspiring black 
elite – an instrument to counter the injus-
tices of apartheid. In practice, this elite 
is often closely interwoven with the ANC. 
Officials from South Africa’s Department 
of Mineral Resources (DMR) are said to have 
advised firms to negotiate directly with the 
traditional authorities about contracting 
because this avoids the need to consult with 
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the communities – making deals far easier 
to conclude. 
Cyril Ramaphosa began to tackle these 
abuses as soon as he took office. Since Feb-
ruary 2018, the DMR has undergone a 
fundamental restructuring. One of Rama-
phosa’s key promises is to curb corruption 
in South Africa’s government agencies. 
The debate about on how to respond to 
the practices of the traditional authorities 
is highly politically charged. The EFF have 
called for the Ingonyama Trust to be fully 
nationalised in order to then make the land 
available to the population. The Zulu king 
then publicly stated that he was prepared to 
go to war should the fund be expropriated. 
During a visit by the king, Cyril Ramaphosa 
kneeled before him in a symbolic act. The 
President assured him that he would con-
tinue to take seriously the rights of the 
traditional authorities. 
Ramaphosa’s gesture was largely mis-
understood. It was sharply criticised by 
those parts of the population that long for 
a departure from the traditional adminis-
trative structures. The ANC, on the other 
hand, aims to avoid any renewed conflicts 
with the traditional authorities where pos-
sible, not least because they have powerful 
political representatives. 
A conflict with the traditional authorities 
in KwaZulu-Natal would be an awkward 
development before the elections, especial-
ly for Ramaphosa. KwaZulu-Natal has long 
been the thorn in the side of the ANC be-
cause it is home to the Inkatha Freedom 
Party. Jacob Zuma was given political sup-
port in the province because he himself is a 
Zulu and had powerful allies. When he was 
forced to resign by the ANC in 2018, there 
were protests from ANC supporters in the 
province. Since taking over the office of 
ANC leader, Ramaphosa has had to fight for 
the full support of his party. It is, however, 
unlikely that the ANC will be able to effec-
tively reduce the power of the traditional 
elites even after the elections and it will 
depend on how much support they can 
muster. Nevertheless, the Trust will have 
to answer for its actions before a South 
African court. 
Living and Working in 
Urban Centres 
The challenge of creating and allocating 
urban housing has become at least as im-
portant as the redistribution of rural land 
in South Africa. In 1980, around 43 percent 
of the population lived in urban areas, com-
pared to 60 percent in 2015. And UN fore-
casts point to steady growth – up to 80 per-
cent of the South African population could 
become city dwellers by 2050. Given the 
growth in urban areas, the population will 
require more housing in future. 
Once again, the question of equity plays 
a role here. The apartheid regime’s housing 
policies and its distribution of land owner-
ship cemented the structural gap between 
Blacks and Whites. The effects of segrega-
tion between the white centres and non-
white outskirts can still be seen today. 
Around three million housing units have 
been built since 1994, as part of a very am-
bitious social housing programme. Despite 
this, up to 20 percent of South African 
households are still located in traditional 
or informal settlements; the latter have gen-
erally been built without official permits. In 
Cape Town, the richest city in South Africa, 
81.6 percent of all households had access 
to legal housing in 2016. Conversely, this 
means that almost one-fifth of the popu-
lation there lives neither in legally secured 
tenancies nor has legal access to services 
such as electricity or water. 
Social housing units being built as part 
of the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme are mostly located in those 
peripheral neighbourhoods that were allo-
cated to Blacks under the apartheid regime. 
Many South Africans are deeply rooted 
in their communities, the township is no 
longer necessarily a place of social disad-
vantage. Nevertheless, critics complain that 
building social housing in the townships, 
far away from economic centres, promotes 
segregation. 
This form of segregation is riddled with 
a number of other problems. Many people 
have to travel long distances to reach urban 
centres. This is very costly and jeopardises 
 SWP Comment 22 
 April 2019 
 7 
their chances on the South African labour 
market. Many sleep on the streets in city 
centres or in squats during the week so they 
can get to work more easily because of the 
high travel costs and long distances. 
According to a survey conducted by Sta-
tistics South Africa in 2015, more than two-
thirds of households who fall in the lowest 
income quintile spent more than 20 per-
cent of their monthly household income 
per capita on public transport, while less 
than three percent of households from the 
highest income quintile spent more than 20 
percent of their monthly household income 
per capita on transport. 
The South African government has 
launched several programmes to address 
these problems. Under the slogan, “Corri-
dors of Freedom”, it initiated the construc-
tion of a local and long-distance transport 
network to improve mobility and thus 
bring about economic and social equality. 
But, as the example of Johannesburg shows, 
approaches implemented so far have not 
been successful in eliminating social segre-
gation. To date, it is mainly members of 
the middle and upper classes that use the 
“Gautrain”, a modern express train that 
links economically significant districts in 
Johannesburg and in Pretoria. The train is 
too expensive for anyone on an average 
income. They prefer to take buses operated 
by Rea Vaya which are more affordable. As 
before, however, a large part of the popu-
lation still travels long distances on foot 
or uses the informal system of minibuses, 
which also links the outskirts of urban 
areas. 
Today, racially segregated groups tend to 
mix more when black South Africans climb 
the social ladder and then subsequently 
move into formerly white residential areas. 
There are various efforts in South Africa to 
overcome segregation. For example, the 
City Support Programme (CSP) aims to cre-
ate mixed residential and working areas 
that offer better mobility and more acces-
sible services. One challenge for urban 
planning is to find a balance between pub-
lic responsibility, private sector investment 
and community participation. Above all, 
this requires time and patience. 
However, it is already possible to set 
aside land in urban areas for housing at 
short notice. For example, the government 
could develop unused state housing in 
South African cities or improve the infra-
structure in existing informal settlements. 
State-owned land could be made available 
to create affordable housing without much 
effort. Lastly, long-term concepts are needed 
for sustainable development in urban 
centres. 
Potential Frustration 
Analyses have clearly shown that the hotly 
debated issue of expropriation without 
compensation is only one element of land 
reform in South Africa. The assertion that 
South Africa’s unequal distribution of in-
come could be virtually wiped out by ex-
propriating land owned by Whites is merely 
an empty promise peddled by predominantly 
populist forces. Nevertheless, they have man-
aged to force the ANC to change course. 
The latest Afrobarometer survey high-
lights the importance of a fairer distribu-
tion of resources among South Africans: 62 
percent of respondents said they would be 
prepared to give up their right to vote if 
they had access to service delivery (such as 
water or housing). Widespread dissatisfac-
tion has lead to an increase in the number 
of political protests in recent years. 
South Africa is still a country with demo-
cratic principles and well-established institu-
tions that were damaged but not destroyed 
by Jacob Zuma’s ‘state capture’. A large 
share of the population is critical of expro-
priations without compensation: 53 percent 
support the principle of ‘Willing Buyer, 
Willing Seller’. However, the government’s 
consultations also show that disadvantaged 
groups in particular are in favour of a more 
radical approach and of expropriation with-
out compensation. 
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In all likelihood, the next South African 
government will again be led by the ANC. It 
will be confronted with the task of imple-
menting a land reform with fast and visible 
results, but which will nevertheless be car-
ried out according to the rules of democracy. 
Renewed failure to redistribute land would 
compound the population’s already con-
siderable sense of frustration. 
Dr Melanie Müller is an Associate in the Middle East and Africa Division at SWP.  
Laura Kotzur was an intern in the Middle East and Africa Division at SWP. 
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